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Palestinian refugees’ long-fought struggle for legal protection, return 
and restitution relates to a broader political struggle for individual 
and collective recognition as key civic stakeholders in the Palestinian 
people’s struggle for self-determination. This paper briefly sketches 
the turbulent history that has resulted in a political impasse and the 
largest group of forcibly displaced persons in the world. It also assesses 
the resulting ‘protection gap’ for these refugees and makes reference to 
recent developments in international refugee law and forced migration 
discourses that provide new legal protection possibilities. The paper 
concludes that invoking international law obligations in political and 
popular discourse and involving Palestinian refugees as key civil society 
stakeholders, play both a key role in the legal protection of refugees and 
in offering greater prospects for a peaceful resolution of the impasse.
1. Introduction
Whether as individuals or as part of a group making collective claims, 
Palestinian refugees have long struggled against social exclusion and 
for recognition of their legal rights. This struggle for individual legal 
protection, return and restitution relates to a broader, collective struggle 
for political recognition and participation as key civic stakeholders in the 
Palestinian people’s struggle for self-determination.
Mostly excluded from the international legal regime to protect refugees, 
and the mandate of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), by way of a definitional limitation,2 Palestinian refugees were 
 
 
 
 
2 See G. Boling The 1948 Palestinian Refugees and the Individual Right of Return: An 
international law analysis, (Bethlehem: Badil, 2007) and S. Akram and T. Rempel, ‘Temporary 
* LLB (Newcastle), LLM (SOAS), PhD (Utrecht). Lecturer in Law, Human Rights and 
Development at the Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, which is part of Erasmus 
University and Honorary Research Fellow in the School of Law, University of the 
Witwatersrand. The author, a human rights lawyer, has travelled extensively and written 
about the situation in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories.
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initially accorded legal protection through a separate United Nations 
(UN) agency, the UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCP). 
This agency failed after two years, leaving another UN agency, the Relief 
and Works Agency (UNRWA) providing humanitarian assistance, but 
with no legal protection mandate, resulting in a legal ‘protection gap’.3
Efforts to secure legal protection for Palestinian refugees in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories and in neighbouring countries have been 
principally thwarted by Israel’s denial of nationality to non-Jews, its 
ongoing polices of dispossession and its decades-long, belligerent military 
occupation, despite repeated condemnation of Israel’s behaviour by the 
UN and others. At a political level, Palestinian refugees as a distinct 
group have never been included in successive, failed efforts at achieving 
a negotiated settlement between Israel and the Palestinians. Indeed, such 
efforts at ‘peace-making’ have deliberately excluded their involvement.
But there has been a shift, both in the possibilities for better legal 
protection and in the opportunities for greater political representation. 
After sketching the turbulent history that resulted in Palestinian refugees 
becoming the single largest group of forcibly displaced persons in the 
world, this paper assesses the resulting protection gap and then makes 
reference to recent developments in international refugee law and forced 
migration discourses that provide new legal protection possibilities for 
Palestinian refugees to address this gap. This paper concludes with 
four propositions, which are rooted in an assumption that international 
law obligations – in particular human rights – and the involvement of 
Palestinian refugees as key civil society stakeholders, fulfil important roles 
both in legal protection and in offering greater prospects for a peaceful 
negotiations process.
2. Context to the Palestinian Refugee Crisis
How issues are framed is crucial to how they are perceived in terms of 
state responsibility. As Valerie Hunt has written, ‘context matters because 
context frames how an issue is understood.’ Hunt goes on to argue, that 
‘when news is contextualized in a “thematic” framing, where issues are 
portrayed in more general terms, then the public tends to assign systemic 
or governmental accountability’.4
Protection as an Instrument for Implementing the Right of Return for Palestinian Refugees’, 
22(1) Boston University International Law Journal (2004).
3 See L. Takkenberg, The Status of Palestinian Refugees in International Law, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1998).
4 V. Hunt, ‘The Questionable Place of Rights in U.S. Immigration Policy After September 11: 
Past Policy and Present Public Attitudes’, presented at the 2005 Law and Society Association 
Annual Meeting, Las Vegas, USA.
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Most people’s understanding of the Palestinian refugee issue has been 
bounded in terms of competing moral claims rather than the historical 
context in which hundreds of thousands of Palestinians were uprooted 
from their homes, prevented from returning and later de-nationalised 
by a series of laws. As discussed in this section, the historical context of 
the Palestinian refugee issue has generally been blind to the systematic 
efforts of the Zionist founders of Israel in 1948 to ‘ethnically cleanse’, in 
the words of Ilan Pappe, the Palestinian territory in order to create and 
maintain a Jewish majority.5 
Since the initial expulsion of Palestinians in 1948, the Israeli legal system 
has only recognised Jewish nationality, excluding non-Jews from a variety 
of services, rights and privileges.6 The concept of Israeli nationality does 
not exist in Israeli law.7 Israel is possibly the only country in the world 
where citizenship and nationality are two entirely separate concepts. 
Palestinians who became citizens of Israel in 1948 therefore do not 
enjoy any legally protected nationality. Drawing on this exclusive 
legal distinction, many policies of the Israeli government, particularly 
concerning the Israeli occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza, 
have been characterised by a growing number of authors, including 
former president of the United States of America Jimmy Carter as 
apartheid, or ‘apartheid-like’ practices.8
According to the UNRWA and Badil Resource Center for Palestinian 
Residency and Refugee Rights (Badil), Palestinian refugees form the 
largest single group of forcibly displaced people in the world, estimated 
at between five and seven million. Approximately one third of uprooted 
and dispossessed Palestinians live in refugee camps in Gaza, the West 
Bank, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, assisted by UNRWA. The remaining 
refugees live in exile as part of host societies in other countries, though 
not all have citizenship.
5 I. Pappe, The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine (London: One World, 2006).
6 M. Zeidan, ‘Citizenship without Nationality: The Case of the Palestinian Arab Minority 
in Israel’, Conference paper presented on his behalf by Masri, M. at the Law and Society 
Association Meeting 2008, Montreal, Canada, 29 May – 1 June 2008.
7 J. Schehla, ‘The Invisible People Come to Light: Israel’s “Internally Displaced” and the 
“Unrecognized Villages”’, 31(1) Journal of Palestine Studies, 20-31 (2001) and J. Schechla, 
‘The Material Consequences of Institutionalized Discrimination: Citizens and “Nationals” 
in Israeli Law’, Conference paper presented at the Law and Society Association Meeting 
2008, Montreal, Canada, 29 May – 1 June 2008.
8 J. Carter, Palestine, Peace not Apartheid (Simon and Schuster, 2006); UN, ‘Report of the 
UN Special Rapporteur John Dugard on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian 
territories occupied since 1967, (2007); U. Davis, Apartheid Israel: Possibilities for the 
Struggle Within (London: Zed Books, 2003); P. Bennis, Understanding the Palestinian-Israeli 
Conflict, 46-49 (Northampton: Olive Branch Press, 2007).
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Large numbers of Palestinians reside in Egypt and – until recently – in 
Iraq, while smaller numbers reside in various countries in Europe, the 
United States and elsewhere in the world.
Table 1: Statistics of Palestinian Refugees and Internally-Displaced Persons 
(IDPs)
Year UNRWA 
Registered 
1948 
Refugees
Non-
registered 
1948 
Refugees
1967 
Refugees
IDPs in 
Israel since 
1948
IDPs in the 
OPT since 
1967**
2007 4,510,510 975,190 914,112 325,441 111,803
2008 4,671,811* 1,014,741 955,247 335,204 128,708
* Figure excludes 48,800 persons receiving relief in Israel who were the 
responsibility of UNRWA until June 1952. 
** Including 37,000 persons (2008) who are internally displaced 
refugees – i.e. refugees displaced at least twice.
The figures above reflect estimates according to the best available 
sources and population growth projections. Figures are therefore 
indicative rather than conclusive.
SOURCE: Badil Resource Center on Palestinian Residency and Refugee 
Rights
As table 1 reveals, both an estimated 335,204 Palestinians with Israeli 
citizenship who have been unable to return to their homes and lands since 
1948 after being forcibly displaced, and a further 128,708 Palestinians 
forcibly displaced by events in 1967 are considered to be internally-
displaced persons in terms of international law.9 Similar to most other 
refugee situations in the world, conditions for Palestinian refugees in 
each country are very different, though they all are entitled to various 
universal rights. However, unlike most other refugee situations in the 
world, Palestinian refugees’ right to return (ROR) is not acknowledged 
by the state of Israel.
So how did Palestinians come to be forcibly displaced? Despite numerous 
books and articles about the systematic dispossession, transfer and other 
forms of forced removal of Palestinians, there remains a high level of 
ignorance about the origins of the Palestinian refugee crisis.10 With 
9 K. MacAllister and I. Jaradat-Gassner (editors), Survey of Palestinian Refugees and 
Internally-Displaced Persons (2006-2007), 44 (Bethlehem: Badil, 2007) and Survey of 
Palestinian Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons 2008-2009, Bethlehem: Badil, p.58.
10 c.f. M. Palumbo, The Palestinian catastrophe: the 1948 expulsion of a people from 
their homeland (London: Quartet, 1989); I. Pappe, One Land, Two Peoples (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006) and I. Pappe, supra note 5; E. Rogan and A. Shlaim, The 
War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001) and to some extent B. Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1998), although Morris later revised the book (Revisited, 2004) and 
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some notable exceptions, there have been few efforts, particularly from 
within Israel, to correct this ignorance. The Palestinian-Arab narrative of 
dispossession, which is rooted in international law, directly conflicts with 
a Zionist narrative of maintaining a Jewish ‘homeland’. Nur Masalha has 
termed the Zionist narrative a ‘politics of denial’,11 while the alternative 
Jewish-Israeli organisation Zochrot has referred to the Zionist narrative 
as intertwined with Israelis’ collective ‘amnesia’.12
The most significant event contributing to Palestinian dispossession 
and exile were the events directly leading to and following Israel’s 
unilateral declaration of independence, which Palestinians refer to as the 
nakba. The process of creating the state of Israel involved the systematic 
dispossession of Palestinian land and property, extending well into to the 
time of the British Mandate over the territory, and before.
The following sections explain what I regard as the four main phases of 
this process of ethnic cleansing, which has resulted in an acute protection 
gap for Palestinian refugees, with both legal and political aspects. Since 
the dominant understanding in both popular and political discourses of 
what occurred in what was once known as the Palestinian territory have 
been framed by a Zionist-Israeli narrative, the following is deliberately 
informed by, though hardly pretending to fully represent, a lesser-known 
Palestinian narrative. Such a perspective, which others have written on 
far more comprehensively than the space in this paper allows, helps 
explain the origin of claims made by Palestinian refugees and why efforts 
to secure a peace settlement that ignores this narrative have failed so 
dismally.
2.1 Phase 1: British Mandate over Palestine
Up until the beginning of the twentieth century, the area known as the 
British Mandate of Palestine formed part of the Ottoman Empire for 
several hundred years. With the end of the First World War, the newly-
established League of Nations introduced a paternalistic system of 
mandate territories, providing for a drawn-out process of decolonisation. 
Countries that emerged victorious from the First World War, including 
Great Britain, became ‘trustees’ of territories previously under their own 
control and under the control of others. Under this system, administration 
of the territory of Palestine fell to Britain.
shifted responsibility for Palestinian dispossession away from Israel on to neighbouring 
Arab States. For a comprehensive bibliography and other (e.g. audio-visual) resources on 
this subject, see www.iss.nl/isrpal Last checked on 29.3.10.
11 N. Masalha, The Politics Of Denial: Israel and the Palestinian Refugee Problem (London: 
Pluto Press, 2003)
12 A. P. Weaver, ‘Remembering the Nakba in Hebrew: Return Visits as the Performance of 
a Binational Future’, 6 Holy Land Studies, 125-144: 127.
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Almost immediately following its acquisition of the Palestinian mandate, 
the British colonial administration faced increasing pressure by Zionist 
organisations who desired that a Jewish state be formed in that territory. 
The administration initially permitted unrestrained acquisition of 
property by Zionist organisations, including the then London-based 
Jewish National Fund. The law observed was not British property law, 
but the archaic Ottoman law that did not adequately respect the rights of 
Palestinian tenants. Where Ottoman law did protect public lands, such 
as Islamic waqf, such protections were widely disregarded.13
Jewish immigration to Palestine increased, first gradually and then 
exponentially following mass atrocities and ethnic cleansing operations 
in Europe aimed especially at Jews, but also homosexuals, gypsies and 
people with disabilities. Immigration to Palestine was further stimulated 
by a refusal of the United States, South Africa and other immigrant-
receiving countries to permit additional Jewish immigration.14 Growing 
tensions between European-Zionist ideology and Arab communities 
in the middle-east and North Africa also caused great disruptions for 
minority Jewish communities in these countries and some chose to 
emigrate, including to Palestine.
Despite various explanations raised for this mass Jewish immigration, the 
demographic impact of this large-scale immigration to the small mandate 
territory of Palestine caused a massive disruption for Palestinians – 
Christians, Muslims and Jews – who had lived there for thousands of 
years. To further secure what can contemporarily understood as forcible 
acquisitions of land and almost unrestrained immigration as part of the 
vision of a long-term colonial project by Zionist organisations, Palestinian 
towns and villages as well as the British colonial mandate administration 
became the target of armed Zionist militias.
As a consequence of these events, and many others now well-documented 
by historians,15 thousands of Palestinians lost their homes and lands while 
the Jewish population in the territory increased from 60,000 in the 1920’s 
13 S. Dajani, Ruling Palestine, A History of the Legally Sanctioned Jewish-Israeli Seizure 
of Land and Housing in Palestine (Geneva and Bethlehem: COHRE and BADIL, 2005).
14 S. Peberdy, ‘Not white like us: preserving the “original stocks” and the exclusion of Jewish 
immigrants’, in Selecting Immigrants: Nationalism and National Identity in South Africa’s 
Immigration Policies, 1910-2008 (Johannesburg: Wits), 57-84.
15 I. Pappe and B. Morris, supra note 10 as well as W. Khalidi, Before Their Diaspora: A 
Photographic History of the Palestinians, 1876-1948, (Washington D.C.: IPS, 1984); W. 
Khalidi, All that remains: The Palestinian Villages Occupied and Depopulated by Israel in 
1948 (Washington D.C.: IPS, 1992); N. Masalha, Expulsion of the Palestinians: The Concept 
of Transfer in Zionist Political Thought: 1882-1948, (Washington D.C.: IPS, 1992); N. Masalha, 
A Land Without a People (London: Faber and Faber, 1997); N. Masalha, supra note 11 and 
A. Abunimah, One Country: A bold proposal to end the Israeli Palestinian Impasse, (New 
York: Metropolitan Books, 2006); V. Kattan, From Coexistence to Conquest: International 
Law and the Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1891-1949 (London: Pluto, 2009).
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to over 300,000 in 1948. Both of these developments were directly related 
to Zionist efforts to establish a Jewish state.
2.2 Phase 2: 1948
The second, and most dramatic phase of Palestinian dispossession was 
not unrelated to the first, being the culmination of the openly-stated 
intentions of Zionist organisations to form a Jewish state, at the cost of 
the indigenous Palestinian inhabitants. By 1947, the British mandate of 
the territory was coming to an end and members of the League of Nations 
(League) were busy concluding an agreement to form the UN, which 
would replace the League. One of the first efforts of the nascent UN was 
to introduce a compromise plan to resolve growing tensions between 
mostly immigrant Jews and indigenous Palestinians; this became known 
as the UN Partition Plan, contained in UN General Assembly Resolution 
181 of 1947.
The Partition Plan was understandably accepted by the Zionist leaders 
(as they had everything to gain by it) and understandably rejected by 
Arab states and the Palestinian leaders (who would have faced massive 
dispossession by the Plan). However, the detailed terms of the Plan, 
which included various legal protections for all civilians, became largely 
irrelevant as the British withdrew and the by now dominant and well-
armed Jewish-Zionist immigrant community declared the establishment 
of the state of Israel, precipitating a war between Israel and surrounding 
Arab states. Following the war, Israel, supported by powerful states 
including the United Kingdom, The Netherlands and later the USA,16 
retrospectively interpreted the Partition Plan as justifying the expulsion 
of several hundred thousand Palestinians, who had been either physically 
expelled or fled the violence and in any event were prevented from 
returning to their homes and lands.
Over 530 Palestinian towns and villages were destroyed and/or entirely 
removed of their Palestinian Arab inhabitants as a consequence of the 
war. Israel, meanwhile, received widespread recognition by powerful 
states in Europe and the USA. Further, from the moment it declared 
statehood in 1948, the Israeli government declared a state of emergency, 
legally permitting Israel to limit fundamental rights to the inhabitants of 
the territory it controlled.17
The chaotic situation led the UN into a – largely self-created – cul-de-sac, 
trying on one level to preserve the rights of indigenous Palestinians while 
16 W. Bass, Support Any Friend: Kennedy’s Middle-East and the Making of the U.S.-Israel 
Alliance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
17 The declaration of a state of emergency has continued, unbroken, to the present day.
Imagining a Shared Future: Perspectives on Law, Conflict and Economic Development in the Middle East
204
simultaneously accommodating the forceful demands of Jewish-Zionist 
immigrants.18 As briefly mentioned earlier, the first development arising 
out of these UN-led efforts was the establishment of the UNCCP, which 
amongst other matters was mandated to protect Palestinian property 
rights. The second development was the establishment of the UNRWA, 
which was established to provide emergency humanitarian assistance 
to several hundred thousand Palestinian refugees who had been exiled 
to Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. Finally, the UN General Assembly passed 
Resolution 194 of 1948, which amongst other provisions affirmed well-
established rights, that ‘refugees wishing to return to their homes and 
live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the 
earliest practicable date’.
2.3 Phase 3: 1967-1973
Despite these efforts of the UN, the Palestinian nakba seemed to have no 
end and in 1967 Israel once again became embroiled in a large-scale war 
with its neighbours. In a short period of time, an exceptionally well-armed 
Israeli military managed to occupy large territories: Sinai, including the 
Gaza Strip, the territory of Egypt; Golan, the territory of Syria and the 
West Bank, the territory of Jordan. The territories occupied by Israel were 
populated mostly by Palestinians. For those who had fled the war in 1948 
and had already spent twenty years in exile, the events of 1967 that caused 
further, forced displacement represented a second nakba.
Responding with overwhelming military force to fledgling efforts by 
Palestinians to defend their homes and lands, the Israeli government 
and military officers – in 1967 and on many occasions since, including a 
further devastating war in 1973 – have become implicated in numerous 
atrocities, including acts of collective punishment against Palestinian 
civilians.19
2.4 Phase 4: 1973 – Present
In terms of a settlement negotiated by then US President Carter, Israel 
withdrew from the Sinai territory in 1973. However, Israel continued 
to occupy Golan, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, in defiance of UN 
Security Resolution 242 of 1967.
18 This contradictory and unprincipled position of the UN was, sadly, a sign of things to 
come.
19 These violations are well-documented by Israeli, Palestinian and international NGOs as 
well as United Nations agencies, including the Office of the UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, UN OCHA, UNRWA, The Palestinian section of the International Committee 
of Jurists, Al-Haq, Palestinian Center for Human Rights (PCHR), B’tselem, Hamoked, 
Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and many others.
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Israel’s occupation from the 1970s has led to annexation of Palestinian 
land. Israel has systematically violated article 49 of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention by establishing or permitting military outposts and 
eventually Jewish-Israeli settlements on land in the occupied territories, 
marked in the West Bank and East Jerusalem by the UN-brokered 
‘green-line’ of armistice. Increasing encroachment of the settlements 
and military installations set up to protect the settlements has led to 
further forced displacement. This is but one of many flagrant violations 
by Israel as occupying power, and resulting in a third nakba for millions 
of Palestinians.20
Defying numerous calls by the United States, European countries, the UN 
Security Council and General Assembly and International Court of Justice 
for Israel to immediately cease settlement construction and dismantle 
existing settlements, Israel has continued expanding the settlements, 
withering the prospects of realising a ‘two-state solution’.
Figure 1
20 As countless reports of the United Nations have confirmed, despite being a signatory 
to the Geneva Conventions of 1948, Israel has continually refused to respect the laws of 
humanitarian conflict or their human rights obligations, in particular concerning their 
treatment of civilians in occupied territories. Particularly horrific, recent examples of these 
atrocities took place towards the end of 2008 and beginning of 2009, during Israel’s illegal 
aggression in the Gaza strip. The activities of the UN concerning Palestine are archived at: 
www.unispal.un.org Last checked on 29.3.10.
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As figure 1 illustrates, the consequences of more than 60 years of 
dispossession, reinforced by a more than 40-year long occupation of the 
West Bank, East Jerusalem, Gaza Strip and the Golan and Israel’s massive-
scale construction of settlements, have resulted in an ever diminishing 
patch of land that – since the League of Nations mandate – states and 
international organisations have elusively sought to develop as an 
‘autonomous’, Palestinian state.
Using the stated justification of protecting Israel (and its illegal 
settlements) against militant attacks, but in practice seeking to reinforce 
unsupported claims that view the West Bank, Gaza Strip and much of East 
Jerusalem as sovereign territories of Israel, Israel began constructing a 
Wall in 2002.21 The Wall has snaked its way around the illegal settlements,22 
protecting these and Jewish settler-only roads and has encircled much of 
the Gaza strip. In the West Bank and East Jerusalem, the wall encroaches 
deep within the green line, and has caused a further wave of forced 
displacement.23 The Wall cuts off Palestinians from their lands, jobs, 
schools, universities and businesses and reinforces a situation referred 
to earlier as resembling apartheid.
Responses to these crimes by armed Palestinian combatants, exercising 
their right to resist (though bound within the limits permitted by 
international humanitarian law), have also violated humanitarian 
law. In particular, Palestinian combatants have unlawfully launched 
inaccurate rockets that are unable to distinguish between military and 
civilian targets in Israel and have killed a small, but still unacceptable 
number of civilians and more especially been the source of much fear 
amongst Israelis.24 The Israeli government’s responses to these rockets 
have been to collectively punish and kill Palestinian civilians. In 2006 and 
especially in 2008-09, Israel’s military forces undertook pre-emptive and 
grossly disproportionate – therefore illegal – attacks, in multiple attacks 
that furthermore involved the illegal use of certain weapons, including 
white phosphorous, and deliberately targeted Palestinian civilians and 
21 Notwithstanding the fact that the Wall is a fence in some places and a thirty-foot high, 
reinforced concrete edifice with watchtowers in other parts of the occupied Palestinian 
territory, the term deliberately used here is consistent with that used by the International 
Court of Justice, which also termed it a ‘Wall’. This point also emerged during the course 
of the conference in Brussels.
22 The illegally-constructed settlements are not small, isolated ‘neighbourhoods’ as 
characterised by Israel, but massive communities of several hundred thousand settlers, 
including college campuses, farms and other businesses, a network of roads and other 
transport hubs for settlers’ exclusive use.
23 Badil Resource Center and Norwegian Refugee Council’s Internal Displacement 
Monitoring Centre, Displaced by the Wall (Bethlehem: Badil, 2006).
24 Human Rights Watch, ‘Indiscriminate Fire: Palestinian Rocket Attacks on Israel and Israeli 
Artillery Shelling in the Gaza Strip’ (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2007).
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civilian areas, as documented by United Nations25 as well as Israeli and 
Palestinian human rights organisations.26
For the 1.1 million Palestinian refugees, out of a total of 1.5 million 
Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, the blatant disregard by Israel for the 
international rules of armed conflict and the resulting atrocities has been 
matched by a silence on the part of most powerful countries, which has 
enraged many, including international legal scholars.27 The experience 
of the past sixty years has also exposed serious weaknesses within the 
United Nations system. As the next section discusses, from their initial 
dispossession in 1948 until the present day, Palestinians have faced an 
acute protection gap.
3. A protection gap
As discussed in the previous section, the actual protection needs of 
Palestinian refugees have become obvious from a thorough consideration 
of the historical context that led to their dispossession. The protection gap 
faced by Palestinian refugees relates to legal and political failures on the 
part of both national and international authorities. These failures have 
left Palestinian refugees in particular, both displaced inside and outside 
Israel, without effective national or international protection.
3.1 Lack of national protection by Israel
From its very inception, Israel has consistently refused to accord 
Palestinians, including Palestinian refugees and internally displaced 
Palestinians in Israel, equal rights in Israeli civil and/or military law. 
As explained earlier, even for Palestinians with Israeli citizenship, the 
failure to accord equal rights to non-Jews and deny them a nationality is 
legally operationalised on the basis of several laws, most passed within 
25 United Nations, ‘Human Rights in Palestine and other Occupied Arab Territories: Report 
of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict’, Ref: A/HRC/12/48, 15 
September 2009 (The “Goldstone Report”). Other reports have been produced by the United 
Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs, UN Relief and Works Agency 
and UN Special Rapporteur for the Occupied Palestinian Territories, most of which are 
available at: http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf Last checked on 29.3.10.
26 A report by Al-Haq, the Palestinian section of the International Commission of Jurists, 
revealed evidence of the Israeli military’s deliberate policies that target civilians and civilian 
areas. Al-Haq Brief: Legal Aspects of Israel’s Attacks on the Gaza Strip during “Operation 
Cast Lead” (Ramallah: Al-Haq, 2009). Similar reports of deliberate atrocities against civilians 
and civilian areas have been produced by B’tselem, including witness reports that Israeli 
soldiers shot woman waving white flag, (Tel Aviv: B’tselem, 2009).
27 In response to the alarming violence of 2008-09 and the lack of an even-handed response 
by powerful countries, a group of internationally respected international legal scholars 
signed a statement rejecting Israel’s argument that it was acting in self-defence and accusing 
Israeli government officials and military commanders of war crimes. ‘Israel’s bombardment 
of Gaza is not self-defence – it’s a war crime’, The Sunday Times, London, January 11, 2009.
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the first few years of Israel’s existence. For Palestinians in occupied 
territories, the failure to recognise equal rights is based on military laws 
that discriminate between the rights of Palestinians and those of Israelis, 
and in particular Jewish-Israeli settlers.
3.1.1 Israel as occupying power 
As an occupying power, Israel’s government and military have violated 
countless international humanitarian laws and human rights laws 
designed to protect Palestinian civilians in general and refugees in 
particular. Israel has – incomprehensibly from a legal point of view – 
sought to justify many of their violations as undertaken in order to protect 
Israelis living in illegal settlements. Numerous violations have been 
documented by UN experts as well as Israeli and Palestinian NGOs.28 
These include violations of the Fourth Geneva Convention on the 
protection of civilians in armed conflict as well as violations of human 
rights law, irrespective of the state of emergency that has existed since 
1948.
Israel’s official terminology has dangerously blurred the debate. Refugees 
have been referred to by Israeli military and government leaders, the 
Israeli military courts and in certain Israeli laws in various, derogatory 
ways. Palestinian resistance fighters are referred to in a blanket way 
as ‘terrorists’, even if they observe rules of international humanitarian 
law by wearing uniforms and targeting the Israeli military. Owners of 
property that cannot be claimed are referred to as ‘absentees’, even though 
the reason for their failure to claim property is because of their inability 
to obtain a residence permit from Israel. Those who attempt to return to 
their homes, property and jobs inside Israel are referred to as ‘infiltrators’. 
The Israeli and international media have uncritically repeated these terms 
and have also been partly responsible for them.
Israeli military laws that apply to occupied territories socially exclude 
Palestinians on the basis of separate application of law, and on the basis 
of defining who is permitted to live in certain areas, as designated by the 
failed Oslo Accords.
3.1.2 Israeli courts
Israeli courts have excluded the vast majority of internally-displaced 
Palestinians in Israel, which manifests itself in three main respects.29 (1) 
28 These include reports of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories, the Israeli organisations B’tselem and Hamoked and Palestinian organisations 
Al-Haq in the West Bank and Palestinian Centre for Human Rights in Gaza.
29 This section partly draws from a presentation by S. Akram and J. Handmaker, ‘Legislative 
and political advocacy: the obligations of Governments under international law’ at the 
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Israeli courts have affirmed the so-called Israeli law of return, which only 
recognises Jewish nationality and effectively denationalises non-Jews.30 
(2) Israeli courts have reinforced the institutionalization of religious-
exclusivity in defining nationality, as mentioned earlier, which also 
restricts family reunification if marriage is to a non-Jew.31 (3) Israeli courts 
have failed to recognise numerous property claims by Palestinians; only a 
handful of properties have been recovered through the Israeli courts. In all 
these respects the Israeli Supreme Court has rendered a highly circuitous 
interpretation of international law, closely resembling the ‘exceptionalism’ 
argument upheld by courts in the United States.32
In these respects, and many others,33 Palestinian rights are excluded 
by way of the Israeli courts (re)defining which rights are to be enjoyed 
by whom, on the basis of arbitrary (religious and/or ethnic-based) 
distinctions.
3.2 Lack of international protection
In addition to a failure of the state of Israel to protect their rights, 
Palestinian refugees lack protection by international organisations and 
third states as well as the international refugee law regime. Palestinian 
refugees also lack protection through a failure to meaningfully include 
their interests in political negotiations.
3.2.1 Early Efforts of the UN
The UN Partition Plan, while never implemented, has become the 
basis for various – abortive – efforts at peace between Israel and the 
Palestinians. Stemming from the Partition Plan, efforts to find a peaceful 
solution on the basis of two-states have been a central feature. This is 
despite widespread sentiments, reflected in scientific studies, that the 
overwhelming majority of Palestinians would choose a one-state solution 
based on international and comparative principles of a secular democratic 
state.34 The idea of a so-called ‘two-state solution’ has thus principally 
United Nations International Conference on the Question of Palestine, New York, Sept 2004.
30 J. Schechla, supra note 7, p. 26.
31 P. Shifman, Civil Marriage in Israel (Jerusalem: Association for Civil Rights in Israel, 2001).
32 S. Akram and M. Lynk ‘The wall and the law: a tale of two judgements’, 24(1) Netherlands 
Quarterly of Human Rights, 61-106 (2006); S. Akram, ‘Do constitutions make a difference 
as regards the protection of fundamental human rights? Comparing the United States and 
Israel’ in The Dynamics of Constitutionalism in an Age of Globalisation, Frishman, M. and 
Muller, S. (eds.) (The Hague: Hague Academic Press / Springer, 2010), 89-109.
33 See HRA, On the Margins 2006: Annual Review of Human Rights Violations of the Arab 
Palestinian Minority in Israel (Nazareth: Arab Human Rights Association, 2006). Last 
checked on 29.3.10 at: www.arabhra.org 
34 Near East Consulting, Survey: 70 percent of Palestinians support one-state solution, 24 
February 2007. See also Y. Stern, ‘Israeli Arabs / ‘Haifa Declaration’ urges Israel to own 
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responded to the (leftist-Zionist) views of Israel, while right-wing Zionist 
interests have maintained that Israel also holds a sovereign claim to the 
occupied territories.
The stated intentions of the UN in seeking to protect Palestinian rights 
have been threefold. (1) The UN aimed to partition Palestine into two 
autonomous, sovereign states in which Jewish-Israeli and Palestinian 
rights were to be equally respected in both states. This model of a ‘two-
state solution’ has failed to progress beyond the realm of political rhetoric. 
Furthermore, policies and practices of the state of Israel, in particular 
Israel’s construction of settlements and the Wall – principally promoted 
by right-wing political interests – have deliberately and irreversibly 
undermined this ‘solution’.
The other two intentions of the UN in seeking to protect Palestinian 
rights have been (2) to provide humanitarian assistance through the 
UNRWA and (3) to document the property and lands of Palestinians 
by way of a register that was partially completed by the UNCCP. This 
last effort in particular has also yielded highly unsatisfactory results. 
More recent efforts have been to document violations of Palestinian 
rights in terms of international humanitarian law, in particular through 
the appointment of a Special Rapporteur on the situation of human 
rights in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967 and an 
independent UN Commission led by Mr. Justice Goldstone in 2009 to 
ascertain whether war crimes had been committed in the Gaza territory 
during the conflict in 2008-09.
The UN General Assembly Resolution 194 of 1948 aimed to recognise 
Palestinian refugees’ rights to return, restitution and compensation, based 
on long-standing, universal principles of international law. The more 
politically compromised, but legally binding Security Council Resolution 
242 sought a ‘just settlement of the refugee problem’, without elaboration, 
also drawing on long-standing principles of international law. However, 
there has been no serious effort on the part of the UN membership to 
ensure implementation of either of these UN Resolutions and protect 
the Palestinian right of return. To the contrary, the UN has revised its 
language consistent with the position of other members of the so-called 
Quartet, in particular the United States, which bear very little, if any 
relation to international law.35
up to Nakba responsibility’, Haaretz, 15 May 2007. The declaration is available at: http://
www.mada-research.org/archive/haifaenglish.pdf Last checked on 29.3.10.
35 Created at the initiative of US president George W. Bush, together with the office of the 
United Nations Secretary-General, European Union and government of Russia.
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3.2.2 Other states’ failure to protect
A second element illustrating the lack of international protection for 
Palestinian refugees includes the failure of other states to hold Israel to 
account for its violations of international law. As a 2004 International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) Advisory Opinion confirmed, states are obliged to 
do so as members of both the UN Charter and in terms of the Geneva 
Conventions.36 Consequently, one of the recommendations of the UN 
General Assembly confirming the 2004 Advisory Opinion was that there 
be a reconvening of member states party to the Geneva Conventions in 
order to implement this principle.37 This reconvening of state parties has 
not transpired.
States have prioritised state security at the cost of human security that 
prioritises the protection of civilians in areas of conflict. The catastrophic 
situation that has resulted is reinforced by third states maintaining the 
legally ambiguous and morally questionable position that Israel has a 
‘right to exist’ as a Jewish state, while the rights of Palestinian refugees 
receive only cursory mention, and only in the context of gaining access 
to humanitarian assistance.
3.2.3 International refugee law
A third, major failure to provide international protection to Palestinian 
refugees has been the purported exclusion from the international refugee 
law regime and in particular article 1D of the 1951 Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees.38 While at first sight this appears to be the clearest 
normative example of political exclusion through legal (re)definition, it 
is in fact the highly restrictive interpretation of article 1D by states that 
has led to a break from the original intentions of the drafters of the 1951 
Convention. The first part of this article reads as follows:
This Convention shall not apply to persons who are at present 
receiving from organs or agencies of the United Nations other than 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees protection 
or assistance.
Many states stop at this particular paragraph and fail to consider second 
part of article 1D, which reads:
36 United Nations, International Court of Justice, ‘Advisory Opinion on Legal Consequences 
of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory’, Issued on 9 July 2004.
37 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution, Ref: A/RES/ES-10/15, 2 August 2004.
38 United Nations, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (1951).
Imagining a Shared Future: Perspectives on Law, Conflict and Economic Development in the Middle East
212
When such protection or assistance has ceased for any reason, 
without the position of such persons being definitively settled in 
accordance with the relevant resolutions adopted by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations, these persons shall ipso facto be 
entitled to the benefits of this Convention.
Read in its entirety, it is clear that Article 1D was never designed to leave 
Palestinian refugees without international protection. Indeed, as a 2002 
Note on International Protection from UNHCR later confirmed,39 the 
drafters of the 1951 Convention could never have envisaged that the 
UNCCP would be effectively shut down, or that Palestinian refugees 
would remain in exile for sixty years. And yet, state practice in the 
application of 1D has given undue attention to the first part of this 
article, resulting in the unlawful exclusion of an indeterminate number of 
Palestinians who have sought refugee protection outside UNRWA areas.40
3.2.4 Exclusion from political negotiations
A fourth area, in which Palestinian refugees – and their rights to return, 
restitution and compensation – have lacked international protection, 
is the exclusion of their interests from political negotiations. This is in 
stark contrast to the peaceful negotiations of other conflicts, which have 
often placed the situation of forcibly displaced persons at the centre of 
the negotiations process.41
The PLO, recognised by many states and the UN as representing the 
interests of the Palestinian people, has raised the issue of Palestinian 
refugee rights as part of the collective right of return, which is itself a 
principal feature of the right to self-determination. The PLO cannot, 
however, exclusively represent the interests of refugees, who also possess 
a separate, individual right to return on the basis of choice, as confirmed 
by other, existing sources of international law.42
But, even in terms of their collective rights, Palestinian refugees have been 
treated as a ‘final status issue’ in terms of a collective right, represented by 
the PLO. With the collapse of the UNCCP, which was designed to protect 
39 UNHCR, ‘Note on the Applicability of Article 1D of the 1951 Convention relating to the 
Status of Refugees to Palestinian refugees’, (Geneva, 2002).
40 J. Handmaker and A. Nieuwhof, ‘No man’s land: Government mistreatment of Palestinian 
asylum seekers, in Musalo, K., Moore, J. and Boswell, R. (editors) Refugee Law and Policy: 
A Comparative and International Approach, Third Edition (North Carolina: Carolina 
Academic Press, 2006)
41 Examples include South Africa, where the return of political exiles was a central feature 
of negotiations between liberation groups and the nationalist government at the time as 
well as the former Yugoslavia, where the return of refugees to Kosovo, Bosnia, Croatia and 
Serbia-Montenegro formed a key pillar of the Dayton Accords.
42 G. Boling, supra, note 1.
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the individual rights of Palestinian refugees, no international organisation 
has stepped in to defend the individual rights of Palestinian refugees. 
Despite its central role in the ongoing impasse and conflict between Israel 
and the Palestinians, the other members of the so-called ‘Quartet’ – the 
United States, the European Union and Russia – have expressed only 
a limited desire to address the interests of refugees. Indeed, in most 
cases, the rights of refugees have been excluded from the framework of 
negotiations altogether.
3.3 Further consequences of the lack of protection
This brief assessment of Palestinian refugees’ lack of access to national and 
international protection has shown that there is both a lack of normative 
(legal) protection and a failure on the part of Israel and international 
organisations to exercise much in the way of actual protection either.
With some exceptions, for example the 2002 Note on International 
Protection by UNHCR, the failure of legal protection has been 
accompanied by the lack of an international body specifically mandated 
to represent Palestinian refugees on their individual rights. There is 
also no specific, binding instrument clearly guaranteeing the rights of 
Palestinian refugees.
Further, the lack of ongoing (actual) protection, through Israel’s failure 
to respect human rights and humanitarian law, has been accompanied 
by Israel’s non-recognition of basic citizenship and nationality rights to 
its non-Jewish residents, many of whom were also forcibly displaced in 
1948. This includes the denial of property restitution, the absence of an 
Israeli nationality and corresponding exclusion from Israeli citizenship 
and other levels of institutional and social exclusion.
In addition, there is a lack of protection through control of movement 
in occupied territories by way of what Jeff Halper of the Israeli 
Committee Against Housing Demolitions, and others, have referred 
to as ‘Bantustans’,43 created by way of civil and military policies. This 
Bantustan policy reinforces Israel’s illegal settlements and settlement 
infrastructure, and the associated regime that primarily exists to protect 
the settler-colonists who reside there illegally.
Finally, refugee camps have been targeted by the Israeli military through 
well-documented cases of collective punishment that punish families 
43 J. Halper, Obstacles to Peace: A Critical Re-framing of the Israel-Palestine Conflict, third 
edition, (Jerusalem: Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions, 2005). See also: www.
icahd.org Last checked on 29.3.10.
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and even entire refugee communities for the acts of Palestinian armed 
resistance groups.
4. Closing the gap
How can these immense protection gaps be filled? While international law 
is so often violated, the fact that so much effort is made by states to try and 
establish that they are, in fact, in compliance with international law gives 
it an enduring value. Ultimately, however, international legal process, 
through legal instruments and legal mechanisms, is wholly dependent 
on a state’s willingness and power to enforce it. As this section argues, 
international law should be seen as aspiring to a political objective. From 
a civic perspective, it is crucial both to engage with international law and 
mobilise advocacy in a strategic way.
4.1 (Re)engaging with international law
In the context of protection to Palestinian refugees, there are three areas of 
engagement that have shown some promise. These are the 2004 Advisory 
Opinion of the ICJ on the legal consequences of Israel’s construction of a 
wall in occupied Palestinian territory, (re)interpretations of international 
refugee law and the principle of temporary protection.
4.1.1 ICJ Advisory Opinion of 2004
Recognising the (il)legal implications of the Wall’s construction, the UN 
General Assembly referred a question to the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ). In requesting an Advisory Opinion, it appeared that the General 
Assembly of the UN sought to re-engage states and the UN institutions 
with international law in protecting the long-neglected interests of 
Palestinians and to finally hold Israel accountable in an even-handed 
manner. Very explicit in the ICJ’s reasoning is that the underlying conflict 
between Israel and the Palestinians, what Ali Abunimah and others 
characterise as an ‘impasse’,44 cannot be resolved without adherence to 
international law.
The key conclusions of the ICJ’s 2004 ruling confirmed the existence of 
various binding obligations in international law. (1) The ICJ confirmed that 
there is a Palestinian people with a right to self-determination, a matter 
of substantial relevance to Palestinian refugees who claim a collective 
right to return to their homeland. (2) Several of Israel’s policies and 
actions were declared by the ICJ to violate international law. In particular, 
Israel violates international humanitarian law and human rights and has 
illegally annexed Palestinian lands and constructed illegal settlements 
44 A. Abunimah, A., supra note 14.
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and infrastructure that only benefits Jewish-Israeli settlers. Furthermore, 
Israel maintains what the ICJ referred to as an ‘associated regime’, 
encompassing a vast military presence of several hundred checkpoints, 
as well as temporary and (semi)permanent structures, including earth 
mounds that have greatly restricted movement by Palestinians and 
particularly refugees, residing in densely-populated camps. (3) The ICJ 
confirmed that it is not only Israel, but ‘all states’ that have obligations to 
ensure respect for international law; in other words, there is a principle 
of collective responsibility, both not to recognise or support the situation 
arising out of Israel’s violations of international law and to hold Israel 
accountable.45
Responses to the Advisory Opinion have been mixed. On one hand there 
has been extensive reference to the Advisory Opinion by human rights 
organisations, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories and others concerned with a just solution to the impasse and 
its associated, ongoing conflicts. On the other hand, states and the UN’s 
main institutions, notably the Security Council have been very reluctant 
to take action. Apart from a handful of cases in the Supreme Court of 
Israel that have forced the government to re-route the path of the Wall, at 
substantial additional cost,46 the ICJ’s ruling has had virtually no impact 
on Israel’s behaviour.47
In 2006, after having withdrawn settlements and checkpoints in the 
Gaza Strip, but continuing to maintain its occupation of the territory 
through control of its borders, Israel began a series of devastating military 
actions in the Gaza Strip. Known as ‘Operation Summer Rains’, the Israeli 
military stated that its aims were to recover an Israeli soldier (who had 
been captured in a legally legitimate military raid by the militant group 
Hamas) and to stop rocket attacks emanating from Gaza.48 In several 
weeks of relentless bombardment of civilian targets and infrastructure 
that caused a massive humanitarian crisis, the operation failed to achieve 
either of these objectives.49
45 See also S. Akram and J. Quigley, A Reading of the International Court of Justice Advisory 
Opinion on the Legality of Israel’s Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, (Washington 
D. C.: The Palestine Center, 2004), Last checked on 29.3.10 at: http://www.palestinecenter.
org/cpap/pubs/update_on_wall_072004.pdf 
46 There have been rumours circulating on right-wing websites such as www.onejerusalem.
org (Last checked on 29.3.10) that the Israeli military has run out of funds to finish 
construction of the Wall.
47 Akram and Lynk, supra note 31.
48 According to the Tel Aviv based Jaffee Centre for Strategic Studies in 2006, attacks in 
Israel by Qassam rockets, which were handmade and with a limited range, had caused 
‘comparatively light’ civilian casualties since their introduction in 2001. BBC News, 
‘Gaza’s rocket threat to Israel’, 15 November 2006 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_
east/3702088.stm Last checked on 29.3.10.
49 At the time of writing, Gaza continued to be under strict Israeli military restrictions, 
leading to what multiple UN and non-governmental agencies have termed a humanitarian 
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Israel, together with members of the Quartet, has sought to isolate the 
democratically-elected Hamas government since the party came to power 
in 2005 / 2006. It has sought to accomplish this by collectively punishing 
all Palestinian residents in Gaza, through imposing a blockade of food, 
medical supplies and other essential items. States have failed to condemn 
Israel’s collective punishment. States have also failed to condemn Israel’s 
illegal capture of elected members of the Palestinian legislature, who at 
the time of writing this article continued to be held in detention.
During Israel’s disproportionate, unlawful aggression in the Gaza Strip 
in 2008-09, known as ‘Operation Cast Lead’, Israel ignored a call for 
ceasefire by the UN Security Council and was later accused of having 
committed war crimes. These included allegations that the Israeli military 
targeted civilians and civilian targets in its actions in the Gaza Strip, 
such as hospitals and schools, and that the military illegally made use 
of certain weapons, such as white phosphorous.50 These allegations led 
the United Nations Secretary General to call for an investigation into 
possible war crimes, which was eventually undertaken by an independent 
commission led by Mr. Justice Goldstone.51 However, so far, Israel has 
escaped condemnation, let alone punishment, by third states, a situation 
that emphasises and indeed facilitates Israel’s continued impunity.
It is clear from leaked comments made by Alvaro De Soto following his 
stepping-down as Under-Secretary General of the UN and representative 
to the Quartet as well as successive reports by Professor John Dugard, 
former Special Rapporteur for the Occupied Palestinian Territories, that 
all members of the Quartet essentially take their lead from the United 
States government in Washington.52
The persistent failure by other states, the UN General Assembly and 
the UN Security Council to hold Israel to account for its continued 
belligerence and blatant violations of international law have resulted in 
a monumental failure of their ‘Responsibility to Protect’ civilians.53 As 
Dugard already put it in 2004, ‘Israel’s defiance of international law poses 
catastrophe.
50 Amnesty International, ‘Israel used white phosphorus in Gaza civilian areas’, London, 
19 January 2009.
51 B. Ki-moon, ‘Opening remarks at press conference’, (Gaza: United Nations, 20 January 
2009).
52 End of Mission Report, Alvaro de Soto, Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations 
Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process and Personal Representative of 
the Secretary-General to the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian 
Authority, May 2007. Available at: http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-files/Guardian/
documents/2007/06/12/DeSotoReport.pdf 
53 J. Handmaker, ‘Responsibility to protect: when international authorities fail’ in G. Kerber 
and S. Asfaw (editors), The Responsibility to Protect: Ethical and Theological Reflections, 
World Council of Churches: Geneva, 70 – 82 (2005).
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a threat not only to the international legal order but to the international 
order itself’ and that this was ‘no time for appeasement’.54
In light of Israel’s continued defiance and silence, if not complicity, on 
the part of the UN and third states, Dugard later revised his message as 
follows:
The Security Council has largely relinquished its powers in respect 
of the Occupied Palestinian Territory in favour of ... the Quartet. ... 
without a founding resolution or mandate from either the Security 
Council or the General Assembly. ... The Quartet does not see it 
as its function to promote respect for human rights, international 
humanitarian law, the advisory opinion of the International 
Court of Justice, international law or countless United Nations 
resolutions on the subject of the Occupied Palestinian Territory.55
The implications of Israel’s disregard for international law and the 
failure of other states to hold Israel accountable have been disastrous 
for Palestinian refugees. The construction of the separation wall has led 
to new categories of refugees, further displacing Palestinians, including 
some who had already experienced forced displacement in 1948, 1967 or 
in other conflicts.56 The solution, therefore, as Dugard and others have 
argued is to re-engage with international law, as confirmed by the ICJ. 
This legal reasoning has become a central pillar of a global, civic campaign 
of boycotts, divestments and sanctions against Israel.57
4.1.2 Refugee Law
As explained earlier, the international refugee protection regime has 
largely excluded Palestinians from its remit and, apart from a brief 
mentioning in its annual report, the UNHCR has paid little attention to 
their plight. From 2002, however, when the UNHCR clarified its position 
concerning article 1D, and in 2006 when the UNHCR and UNRWA 
54 United Nations Economic and Social Council, ‘Question of the Violation of Human Rights 
in the Occupied Arab Territories, including Palestine, Report of the Special Rapporteur of 
the commission on Human Rights, John Dugard, on the situation of human rights in the 
Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967’, 7 December 2004, E/CN.4/2005/29.
55 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, United Nations 
General Assembly, 17 August 2007, Ref: A/62/275.
56 K. McAllister and I. Jaradat-Gassner, Displaced by the wall: Forced displacement as a 
result of the West Bank wall and its associated regime, (Bethlehem and Geneva: Badil and 
Norwegian Refugee Council Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2006). Last checked 
on 29.3.10 at: www.internal-displacement.org 
57 The global, non-violent BDS movement represents a broad collection of interests. 
Gaining inspiration from the justifications and tactics seen during the South African anti-
apartheid movement, the movement has marked some significant successes. See: http://
bdsmovement.net/ 
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issued a joint statement concerning their organisation’s respective 
responsibilities, the protection concerns of Palestinian refugees have 
received more attention. Every year from 2005 until 2007, at the annual 
meeting of the Executive Committee of UNHCR, NGO statements have 
included mention of Palestinian refugees. For example, in 2007, NGOs 
including the following in their collection statement on international 
protection:
Palestinian refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) 
constitute the largest and longest-standing unresolved caseload 
of refugees and displaced persons in the world today. NGOs urge 
the international community to increase efforts to find voluntary 
durable solutions to their plight.58
UNHCR and UNRWA now routinely report on the protection situation 
of Palestinian refugees. These collective efforts on the part of UNHCR, 
UNRWA, other UN Agencies such as OCHA and NGOs have undeniably 
raised the profile of Palestinian refugees as a global protection issue.
4.1.3 Temporary Protection
A further development raised by international lawyers in various 
meetings and fora, including the 2006 Pre-EXCOM NGO sessions in 
Geneva, concerns a comprehensive proposal of temporary protection for 
Palestinian refugees. Developed by Professor Susan Akram, together with 
Terry Rempel, the proposal draws on extensive comparative state practice 
and a comprehensive reading of state obligations towards Palestinian 
refugees contained in numerous binding instruments.59
The proposal for temporary protection argues that it is possible to 
extend what is known as a ‘complementary’ form of protected status 
to Palestinian refugees, who would otherwise benefit in full from the 
protections provided by the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees were it not for a single, restrictive paragraph contained in Article 
1D. As discussed later, this article has since been reaffirmed by UNHCR 
as not intending to leave Palestinian refugees without any protection. In 
this spirit, recognition through the status of temporary protection would 
create individual and collective state obligations and incentives to protect 
58 UNHCR, NGO Statement, Agenda Item 5a (International Protection), 58th Executive 
Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, 1-5 October 2007
59 S. Akram and T. Rempel, ‘Temporary Protection as an Instrument for Implementing the 
Right of Return for Palestinian Refugees’, 22(1) Boston University International Law Journal, 
(2004) and T. Rempel (editor) Revisiting the Role of International Law in Crafting Durable 
Solutions for Palestinian (Bethlehem: BADIL, 2009).
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the basic rights of Palestinian refugees and to provide a durable solution 
to their plight.60
4.2 Through strategic civic advocacy
Civic advocacy often draws on international law. Whether or not legal 
options are exhausted, there is much scope for civic advocacy in seeking 
to enhance state accountability. As explained by veteran human rights 
advocate Adri Nieuwhof, authoritarian regimes, such as the state of Israel, 
can be held accountable through a combination of four inter-linking 
strategies. These comprise: (1) a well-argued communication of the legal 
and moral justifications for advocating a state’s accountability, (2) political 
pressure and (3) economic isolation through boycotts, divestments and 
sanctions. Finally (4), Nieuwhof argues that it is crucial to provide support 
to civic structures that are mobilised in the country where violations are 
taking place.61
As Badil, Al-Awda, the Right of Return Coalition and others have 
demonstrated, constructing a refugee rights discourse that articulates 
the legal and moral justifications requires a strategic approach, bearing 
in mind the potential and challenges of legal avenues for claiming those 
rights as well as the interests of various stakeholders, which are often 
overlapping. Such an approach that engages refugee communities, 
political leadership, Israeli society and finally individual states and the 
United Nations, together with NGOs and other civic actors around the 
world.
A global coalition of activists, including Badil as well as NGOs such 
as Al-Haq in Ramallah and the Palestinian Center for Human Rights 
(PCHR) in Gaza, have demonstrated that recognition of Palestinian 
rights through a rights-based approach can be very productive. Badil 
has also engaged sections of Israeli society through strategic links with 
organisations such as Zochrot, a Tel Aviv-based network of human rights 
advocates calling for a rejection of Israelis’ ‘collective amnesia’. Al-Haq 
has earned an international reputation for its well-argued reports that 
document Israel’s systematic violations of international law. The PCHR 
have also documented violations of international law by Israel and have 
60 Such durable solutions may include any of the following: return, restitution, compensation, 
resettlement or integration in host countries.
61 J. Handmaker, ‘Civil society and international law: protecting and promoting human 
rights in the light of the July 2004 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice’, 
in United Nations International Meeting on the Question of Palestine. Implementing the 
advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legal consequences of the 
construction of a wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory - the role of Governments, 
intergovernmental organizations and civil society, United Nations Office at Geneva, 8 and 
9 March 2005, 75-82 (New York: United Nations, 2005).
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launched numerous claims at the United Nations and in various countries 
around the world.
Through advocating for the application of international law as an 
alternative to violence, all three of these organisations have developed 
respectable profiles as authorities on Palestinian (refugee) rights, which 
have been validated through their being accorded consultative status by 
the United Nations.
5. Some conclusions and propositions
Notwithstanding its numerous drawbacks, but given the highly unstable 
situation in Israel, the Occupied Palestinian Territories and the Middle 
East in general, it would be prudent to return to the one institution, 
long-neglected by the Quartet, which was established to prevent the 
reoccurrence of war and to resolve conflicts on the basis of international 
law, namely the United Nations.
Numerous efforts to resolve the impasse between Israel and the 
Palestinians and find peace on the basis of ‘discovering the common 
ground’ have failed miserably, and with bloody consequences. They 
have failed, not only because of their failure to recognise massive legal, 
social and economic inequalities, but because of a highly-unprincipled 
approach on the part of those seeking to ‘bring peace’ to the region. The 
approach outlined by the Quartet – and led especially by the United 
States – regards three, major issues perceived as presenting ‘obstacles’ 
to any peace settlement, namely the status of Jerusalem, the fate of the 
settlements and the plight of Palestinian refugees. The Quartet has then 
relegated these key issues to the back burner, treating them as so-called 
‘final status’ issues in the hope that at some stage, an interim peace 
settlement can be found. This approach simply has not worked.
An alternative approach, which so far the UN has not applied to any 
significant degree, though strongly advocated by Professor Dugard, 
would be one based on international law and human rights. Rather 
than being hampered by massive inequalities, the UN would be directly 
engaged in redressing those inequalities and ensure that civilians, 
including Palestinian refugees, were directly engaged in finding a solution 
to the impasse between Israel and the Palestinians.
An approach rooted in international law offers a highly desirable 
alternative to stagnated diplomacy and a seemingly endless cycle of 
violence. It declares that human rights are inextricably linked to peace; 
in other words, respect for international law (and human rights) is a pre-
requisite to a peaceful outcome. Such an approach furthermore expands 
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the possibilities of alternative solutions to the now defunct prospects of 
a two-state solution.
In light of this analysis, I offer the following propositions.
The first proposition is that international law (and by extension human 
rights) serves as the most credible basis for restoring equitable legal protection. 
This proposition recognises that the legal status of Israelis as well as 
Palestinians should be based on the principle of normative equality. 
It urges that mechanisms be put in place, both to claim that status, in 
order to achieve actual equality, and to resolve conflicting rights that will 
inevitably arise.62 It assumes that an increased respect for human rights 
will increase the prospects for peace.
The second proposition is that recognising the right of return is an essential 
pre-requisite to any peace settlement. This will, of course, require considerable 
compromises by Israel, which are the highly unfortunate consequences 
of Israel’s reconstructing of ‘facts on the ground’, notably the decades-
long illegal construction of settlements on occupied Palestinian territory. 
However, as the Israeli organisation Zochrot has declared, recognising the 
right would ‘enable a space where the Nakba can be spoken of or written 
about’ both in Arabic as well as Hebrew, in other words, re-framing the 
debate.63
The third proposition is that refugees must be provided a role to participate 
in political negotiations. The reasoning here is that refugees are seen not 
as part of the problem, but as part of the solution. As Valerie Hunt has 
argued, the ‘moral perspective of deservedness plays a large role in 
how we understand the assignment of rights to different groups within 
society’.64 It furthermore allows one ‘to make positive connections’ 
between one and the other’s national identities.65
The fourth and final proposition is that alternative models for resolving 
the decades-long impasse, including the option one, secular democratic state is 
deserving of serious consideration.66 A change of facts on the ground have 
created permanent structures in the settlements, and rendered a two-state 
solution socially and economically impossible. As Abunimah and others 
62 M. Kagan, ‘Do Israeli Rights Conflict With the Palestinian Right of Return? Identifying 
the Possible Legal Arguments’, Working Paper 10, Badil, August 2005.
63 N. Musih, ‘Learning the Nakba as a condition for peace and reconciliation’, Position Paper 
(Zochrot: Tel Aviv, no date). Last checked on 21.1.09 at: http://www.zochrot.org/index.
php?id=642 
64 V. Hunt, supra note 3 at 27.
65 Ibid, 16.
66 For more on this topic, see http://www.yorku.ca/ipconf (Last checked on 18 February 
2011).
Imagining a Shared Future: Perspectives on Law, Conflict and Economic Development in the Middle East
222
have argued, Israel has in fact already created one-state separated into 
various cantons, all of which are under the effective control of the Israeli 
government and military. All borders are controlled by the Israeli military 
and border police. In Israel, there is growing recognition of the treatment 
of Palestinian citizens of Israel as second-class citizens, including the 
especially appalling treatment of Bedouins inside Israel and throughout 
the occupied Palestinian territories. 
Despite the political rhetoric and apparent momentum in favour of a 
two-state solution, it is abundantly clear that such a solution would not 
resolve the refugee issue, without doubt the most enduring obstacle to a 
just peace in the 60-year long impasse between Israel and the Palestinians.
Following the devastation of Gaza at the beginning of 2009, caused by 
Israel’s illegal aggression, and the continued closure of the West Bank 
and relentless growth of illegal settlements, the prospects of resolving 
impasse between Israel and the Palestinians seems further than ever. 
No resolution of this impasse will be possible in the absence of an even-
handed approach, which international law provides for, but which the 
UN and third states have – until now – refused to apply with any degree 
of consistency, or consequence for Israel.
Until this situation changes, a global, civic-led campaign of boycotts, 
divestment and sanctions offers a non-violent alternative to the horrifying 
cycle of violence in Israel-Palestine.67 Rooted in international law 
principles, this campaign also offers good prospects for promoting justice 
and peace to all who are victims of the ongoing impasse between Israeli 
Zionist ideology and Palestinian national aspirations, and especially 
offers a glimmer of hope for Palestinian refugees, the largest group of 
forcibly displaced persons in the world.
67 For more information on the movement, see http://www.bdsmovement.net (Last checked 
on 18.2.11).
